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Summary  findings
Tfhe  financial  sector should be active in enterprise  The reform of banks and capital markets in tmnsitional
restructuring in the transitional  economies,  and should  economies  should not be modeled too closely  on pattems
help channel resources  to the private sector. What will  in western economies,  with their large institutions,
best help the sector achieve  these tasks: gradual reform  complex financial  instruments,  and extensive  regulation.
or radical  reform?  A simpler process is required, compressing  in a short
Liberalization  and privatization  are the most urgent  period the historical development  of financial  systems-
tasks transitional economics  face. But for market reform  starting with small  banks and accepting  imperfect
to succeed,  reforms of banking and capital markets must  regulation  and supervision  as a fact of life.
keep pace with enterprise reform and privatization.  Systemic  risks remain manageable  if financial
Central and Eastern Europe havc pursued a gradual  institutions  are small  and numerous enough. A system
approach to financial  reform, splitting  the former state  with many privatc banks is morc likely to produce a
bank (or umonobankn)  into a central bank and several  financial  sector thar plays  an activc role in enterprise
lacrg stae-owned commercial  banks, eventually  to be  restructuring,  channels  resources  to the privatc  sector,
privatzed.  Russia has taken a more radical approach,  and thus accelerates restructuring  and economic growth.
creating  many new private commercial  banks that  have  Historical  comparisons confirm the benefits of such a
alrcady taken over most  of the business from  state banks.  liberal, weakly regulated  banking system.
This paper - a product of the Private Sector and Finance Team, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North  Africa
Technical Deparrment-  is part of a largcr effort in the department to analyze  developments in the financial systems  of trnsition
economics. Copiesof the paper are available  free fromthecWorld  Bank, 1818 HStreetNW, Washington, DC20433. Pleasecontact
Luz Hovsepian, room H8-093, extension 37297 (16 pages).  July 1994.
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Banks, Capital Markets and Corporate Govemance:
Lessons from Russia for Eastern-Europe
Summary
The financial sector in transition  economies  should  play an active role in enterprise
restructuring  and channeling  resources  to the private sector. What  type of fnancial reform is
best suited  to achieve  these tasks, a gradual  approach  or a fundamental  approach?
Liberaltion  and privafization  are, without  doubt, the most important  and urgent  tasks
in transition  economies. If market  reforms are to be successful,  banldng  and capital  markets
reform needs to keep  pace with enterprise  reform and privatization.
In Central  and Eastern  Europe, a gradual  approach  to financial  sector  has been  pursued,
splitting  the former state bank, or "monobank",  into a central bank and several large, state-
owned  commercial  banks, to be privatized  eventually. A more fundamental  approach  has been
pursued  in Russia where a large number  of new private commercial  banks has been created
which have  already taken  over most of the business  from state banks.
Banking  and capital  market  reforms  in transition  economies  should  not be modelled  too
closely on today's pattems in Western economies  with large institutions,  complex financial
instruments  and extensive  regulation. Rather, a simpler  process is required, compressing  the
historical  development  of financial  systems  - starting  with small  banks  and accepting  imperfect
regulation  and supervision  as a fact of life.  Systemic  risks remain manageable  if financial
institutions  are numerous  and small  enough. A large number  of private  banks  is more likely to
lead to a financial sector which plays an active role in enterprise restructuring, channels
remsources  to the private sector, and thus accelerates  restructuring  and economic  growth.
Hlistorical  comparisons  confirm  the benefits  of such  a liberal, weakly  regulated  banldng  system.!  I4-m  4.-:-
Banks, Capital Markets  and Corporate  Govemance:
Lessons from Russia for Eastern-Europe
Economic reforms  in transition  economies means market  reforms
Despite massive resources mobilization  and high investments, socialist economies have
experienced dismally low growth of living standards (see, for example, Easterly and Fischer,
1994).  The main reason was the gigantic misallocation of resources.  Hierarchical decision
making  led  to  irrational  production  patterns  and  an  ifl-adapted capital  stock.  Unclear
responsibilities and conflicting signals for managers led to poor performance, a lack of initiative,
slow technological progress, and low productivity.
The ultimate objective of reforms in transition economies is clear:  higher economic
growth and welfare.  The main vehicle is market reforms, including liberalization of prices,
removal of administrative  controls, priatization,  and legal and institutional  reforms (see further,
for exGample,  (elb  and Gray, 1991). Each of these is a momentous undertaking, none of which
can succeed without simultaneous  progress in the other areas.  But, privatzation  is the linchpin.
Not only need firms be privatized, but, equally important, gradually dismantled into a large
number of much smaller firms.  This will take  more than  an initial 
3 "mass  privatization process
and will only happen if poorly performing enterprises are forced to spin-off assets and lay-off
workers.  Financial institutions have to play a  crucial role in  this process.  Early  -and
fundamental  financial sector reform is thus a key prerequisite.2
Fi-andial  refonm in transition economies
Right from the start of  the transformation  of socialist econoinies,  there has been
widespread  recognition  that fundamental  financial  sector reform in transition economies  is
required.'  In-practice, different financial  sector  reform strategies  have been followed. In
Central1and  Eastern Europe, a gradual  approach  has been pursued, splitting  the former state
bank, or 'monobank", into a central bank (with  the usual monetary  and regulatory  functions)
and several  large commercial  banks, inheriting  most of the assets and liabilities.  Financial
reform has mostly  been  limited  to better accounting  and auditing,  better povernment  regulation
and supevsion,  and  some  financial  restructrring  (recapitalization).  It was  hoped  that this  would
lead financial  intermediaries  to play a positive  role in the restructuring  of enterprises  and new
lending.2
Unfortunately,  this has proven to be insufficient,  and sometimes  counterproductive.
Instead  of lending  to new and successful  firms, bank managers  have  continued  to lend to large
unprofitable  entexprises  or financed  government  deficits. The overhang  of bad old loans  - non-
performing  loans account  for as much  as 30 percent  -- means  that the net worth  of many  banks
in Eastern  Europe  is a large negative  number,  in spite  of sometimes  repeated  infusions  of capital
by governments. 3 Few banks  have played  an active  role in the restructuring  of loss-making
firns,  largely  because  these banks are still state  owned  and hold the majority  of assets.'
Gradual  banking  reforms have not succeeded. Even more than for other enterprises,3
private ownership of banks is critical and a direct stake of managers desirable.  While loss-
maldng production enterprises sooner or later  have to adjust, banks can go  on lending to
insolvent enterprises unfil both are in deep trouble.
A more fundamental approach to financial sector refonn has been pursued in Russia.'
The old state banks have shrunk and an entire class of new commercial  banks has been created,
not burdened by old loans and old management practices.  More importantly, the new bank
managers and owners have a direct stake in the financial success of their banks and are more
likely to allocate resources to productive purposes.
We argue,  also in light of historical evidence, that financial sector reform in Russia
presents a useful model for Eastern European countries.  We first describe the Russian reform
in detail and then compare it to the East-European approach.
Much progress in micro-economic  reforms in Russia: little in macro-economic  stabilization
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian economy has
undergone profound economic changes: the command economy has largely been dismantled,
many prices have been liberalized, the exchange rate has been floated, private property rights
have been expanded, trading monopolies  eliminated, and a large number of enterprises have  been
privatized. Most progress has been made in micro-economic  areas, particularly privatization  and
the replacement of administrative allocation by markets.4
However, political  and economic  reforms have also brought  enormous economic  and
social  dislocations,  often  because  of policy  inconsistencies.  Old command  structures  have  been
dismintled before new structures  or rules were put in place or even agreed.  An advance  in
some areas has often led to unforeseen  consequences,  accelerating,  widening  or, sometimes,
delaying  reforms  somewhere  else. A case  in point is the loss of macro-economic  control  during
1992z  aid 1993  that led to high inflation  and rapid depreciation  of the ruble.
It is too early to say whether  the Russian  reforms  will succeed. The transformation  of
the Russian  society  into a democracy  and market  economy  is a far greater  challenge  than nearly
anywhere else.  Nowhere else has central planning  been taken as far, nowhere else were
economic,  structures  as centralized  and distorted  as in the formner  Soviet  Union (see  the World
Bank, 1992  and IMF 1993). But in comparison  to Russia's much  more difficult  starting  point,
considerable  and unexpected  progress has been made.  The unsuccessful  attempts  at macro-
economic  stabilization  to date  should  not be allowed  to cloud  the  judgement. Neither  Germany
nor Japan  were  able  to attain  price stability  during  their  massive  economic  reallocation.  following
the war.. Hyperinflation  facilitated  then  a new  start by wiping  out old debts. The same  is true
now in Russia. With structural  reforms  in place, there  is a realistic  chance  for stabilization  now
to succeed.F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Banking reforms In Rusia  happened very early and unintentionally
Daring  the socialist  period, the state  bank (Gosbank)  had  responsibility  for money  supply,
clearing  and settlement,  accounting  and auditing,  and public  budget management.  Initialy, all
investmnent  funding  came  from the budget,  but Gosbank  was not really a bank. Rather, its role
was to serve as the state's accounting  and auditing  arm.  Later, more investment  funding  was
provided  on credit, with the Savings  Bank (Sberbank)  collecting  savings  from households  and
the Construction  Bank (Stroibank)  lending  these funds to enterprises. However, investment
decision-making  did  not  really  change and  the  Construction Bank mainly supervised
implementation  of projects  decid&l  by the planning  authorities.
In 1987-88,  under perestroika,  a "two-tier"  banking  system  was introduced  by carving
out all commercia bankidng  functions from Gosbank  and creating three sectoral speciaized
ctommercialu  banks: Agroprombank,  Promstroibank  and.Jilsotzbank  (agriculture,  industry  and
services,  respectively),  similar  to elsewhere  in Eastern  Europe. Even more  important  was  a new
law which authorized  the establishment  of cooperative  banks: the number  of banks  mushroomed
from only five in 1987  to over one thousand  in 1990.
The first democratic  elections  at the republican  levels  in 1990  led to a reform movement
and incrasing conflict  with  the more  conservative  Unoion  government. In the sphere  of finace,
the R-ussian  parliament  passed several laws in 1990,  effectively  challenging  the power of the
USSR Gosbank  within  the,  Russian  territory. Enterprises  were  permitted  to establish  banks  and6
to chose  their main  bank freely. The three state  banks changed  their  legal status  to joint-stock
banks  and several  split into many  regional  banks  with  enterprises  as shareholders. The number
of banks expanded  rapidly to over two thousand  in 1993.
While the new commercial  banks were de-facto  independent  and responsible  for their
lending decisions,  they initially controlled  only a small part of the financial  resources: the
current  account  deposits  of enterprises. The largest  source  of credit  continued  tc be household
deposits  at the Savings  Bank  and directed  credits  of the central  bank (which  were onlent  through
the remaining  state banks).  But this was short-lived:  rapid inflation  since 1992 has sharply
reduced  the real volume  of credit  and accelerated  this transformation.
Starting  with  perestroika,  nominal  wages  increases  exceeded  the production  of consumer
goods.  Market-clearing  was achieved  by shortages  and forced savings, creating  a monetary
overhang.  With the liberalizaton of prices and the switch  to a market economy  in 1992,
market-cleanng  was achieved  through  increased  prices.  Lacking  appropriate  wage and credit
restraints, enterprises  simply  passed-on  cost increases, workers obtained  compensating  wage
increases, and the central bank issued more credit to keep enterprises afloat  Inflation
accelerated  and financial  disintermediation  followed. By 1992 credit expanded  by over 800
percent and inflation  by 2300  percent. The consequence  was a rapid decline  in the real value
of financial  claims. By late 1993,  inflation  had eroded the value of household  savings  to less
than 2 percent of GNP, compared  to 37 percent  in 1990 (Table 1).  The balance  sheet of the
Russian  banling system  became  limited  to short-term  deposits,  which  were increasingly  held  at7
commercial  banks. Today, the government's  ability  to finance  expenditures  and enterprise  losses
- -. ,-:--through  a large inflation  tax is sharply reduced.
Table 1
(percent  of GDP,  unless otherwise  noted)
198P  1i8r  19  19r  19  im  1m9m  M
Donad  Credit  65  67  72  73  91  46  22  i5
Cluuoa  anGowmaot  9  IS  26  32  55  7  4  3
Clabn_  am  1trpr  uand  Housduoh  56  52  46  41  37  39  13  12
Money  -51  57  61  64  sO  62  31  16
Curnw  OuldnmBub  9  10  10  p11  12  Y  4  4
Rubl  BDepodh  42  47  S1  S3  67  43  14  6
FXDepouiIs  0  0  0  0  1  11  13  6
Nomnal  GDP  (IL  Diao)'  06  830  373  951  639  1923  37811  323693
elmn  Rate  (ab1eU  0.63  0.53  0.61  9  23  169  415  1247
lo-d  Per Capit  GDP  40R8  4887  4977  - - - 614  1747
(ES at unrts  exchange  ra)
Data  for the USSR.
b  December  GDP  annualized.
For the years  1989-1991 no data for GDP per capita are reported  as there was not a well
functioning  foreign  exchange  market.
The new  tussian  banks:  small, but  entrepreneurial
The two-thousand  new  commercial  banks  are either  entrely new  banks  - so  called  "zero'
banks - or regional  spin-offs  from the thr  sectoral  state banks.  By now both 'zero" and
"spin-of  banks  are represented  among  the largest  commercial  banks (Table  2).  For example
Inikombank  is a zero-bank, Mosbusinessbank  a former Zhilsotsbank  branch, and ICB ifi St.
Petersburg  a former Promstroi branch.
"Zero' banks  were usually  created  by groups  of enterprises,  sometimes  with  only a small
number  of  large enterprises  as shareholders  (so called  "pocket"  banks),  sometimes  with  hundreds
of shareholders. The heavy concentration  in bank shareholding  has been reduced  over time.E  t.
B
Even  before  privatizadon,  the  banks  acted  independently  and  were  de-facto  the most  market-
oriented  sector  in Russia.  With  the  mass  privatization  program  for enterprises,  most  banks  are
now majority  privately  owned.
Table 2:  Assets  of Russia Banks
(as of July 1, 1993)
Total Assets
Rb  billon  % of GNP
Specialized  Banks  14.366  12.1
of which:
Vneshtorgbank  7,597  5.4
Rosselkhozbank  3,984  3.4
Sborbank  1,926  1.6
Promstrolbank  1,273  1.1
20 Largest  Commercial  Bunks  14,479  12.6
Total Assets  Banking  System  41,304  34.9
Total Credit  to Non-Banks  17,697  16.4
(not of interbank  credit)
Many enterprises  have switched  their accounts  to the more successful  banks  and have
oftn  also become  shareholders. Ownership  in 'zero" banks  is usually  fairly  concentrated,  with
the five largest  shareholders  controlling  as much  as half  of the shares.' Ownership  of "spin-off'
banks  is more diversified,  with the largest  shareholder  accounting  for 5-10  percent of equity,
and the largest five for about 25 percent.
The new banks act as corporate treasurers  to their owners and customers.  Many
enterprises  continue  to rely on their banks to monitor  their own financial  conditions  and to
prepare financial  statements. 7 In addition,  banks  provide  payments  services,  deposit  accounts,
short-term  working  capital  loans, etc. Some  sixty  banks  had general  foreign  exchange  licenses
in  1993 and served as  correspondent  banls  to handle foreign exchange  transacdons for
enterprises  and other banks.9
There are few limits on the scope of activities  that banks can undertake. They can
enpgag  in deposit-taking,  lending,  investments,  securities  trading  and underwriting. Portfolio
diversification,  liquidity,  capital  adequacy  and other prudential  regulations  exist  but are liberal.
Banking  supervision  in Russia  remains  wea,  and regulations  are poorly enforced. Due  to high
inflation,  minimum  capital  requirements  were at times  very  low  and permitted  de-facto  free  entry
into bankIdng.'  Recently,  international  accounting  and loan loss provisioning  requirements  have
been  introduced  and will eventually  improve  the  ability  of the Central  Bank  to supervise  banks.
The new  Russian  commercial  banks  remain  small  by intemnational  standards.  The  largest
commercial  banks have a staff of two or three thousand,  a balance  sheet total of about $1-3
billion  and a total share  capital  of about $50-150  million  (Table  3).  As a consequence  of high
inflation,  the three sectoral  state  banks  have  rapidly  shrunk  in real terms. Only  Vneshtorgbank
(with  large foreign  exchange  assets)  and Rossellcozbank  (with  most  of the directed  ruble  credit)
still exceed  the largest  private  banks.




Assets  $ 450  million
Net worth  $  40  million
Foreign  exchange  assets  $ 230 million
Capital/asset  ratio  15%  (range:  2-40%)
Loantassets  ratio  34%
The new  banks operate  mostly  on a regional  (oblast)  basis, with the larger  banks  handling
international  transactions  for the regional  banks.  In every major city there are a handful  of
banks competing,  with many more in Moscow. But strong  relationship  baning  prevails,  as
enterprises  have to shift practically  all their ruble business  if they want to change  banks.
The small size of banks  in Russia  and their  regional  oxientation  is probably  an advantage
at this time.  The small  size largely  eliminates  any systemic  consequences  of bank failures,  a10
realistic possibility given the limited supervision capacity and a poor lender of last resort.  With
_pboir  communicatons, unclear legal rights and remedies, and limited managerial skills, the local
focus enable banks to reduce risks.  Extensive branching would entail substantial monitoring and
control risks.  Some of the larger banks have started to branch out and some mergers have
happened, but even the largest hanks have less than fifty branches, most within their region.
Privatization,  banking  and corporate  governance
The mass privatization progranm,  started in 1992 has been the most significant element of
Russian economic reforms.  It involved, first, the sale of many small firms and assets by local
government through auctions, leases, management buy-outs and similar means.  Second, for
large  enterprises,  a  mass privatation  program  was introduced,  transferring ownership to
managers, workers and the population through voucher auctions.'
In response to political pressures from a strong managerial lobby, managers and workers
were allowed to obtin  large blocks of shares at highly preferential conditions.  As a result,
privatation  became a huge success, at least in terms of enterprises privatized.  By the end of
1993, over 8,000 enterprises had been privatized, employing nearly 9 million employees, or 44
percent of the industrial labor force, and one-thousand medium  and large enterprises were being
privadzed each month.  By mid-1994, three-quarters of the Russian industrial workforce will be
working in privatzed  enterprises.'0
Workers hold around half of the shares, managers about 10 percent, and only another 20
percent of the shares have been sold to the population at large ffirough  voucher actions."  Writh
limited outside ownership, firms are effectively controlled by managers and workers and are
likely to maintain  a strong collective  character.  The greatest danger with so much inside control
is that enterprise governance deteriorates in a Yugoslav workers' collective, with inappropriate
incentives, low productivity and low profitability.  Whether it will come about will depend, in
part, on whether workers will be able to sell their shares to strategic investors.  Managers have
tried to restrict sale of shares by workers (e.g., by controlling share registers, limiting voting3
rights). But this has been.  averted by a government decree in 1993, requiring independent share
registries for enterprises with many employees. Worker-owners can now sell their shares fr-eely
and are likely to do so.
Japanese or German practices labor practices, with lifetime employment and a strong voice
of labor in the management of enterprises, represent the most optimistic outcome - and perhaps
the model to follow.  While managers have a strong position, they will have to tread carefulfly
with respect to  restructuring measures.  Large reductions in  the workforce appear unlikly,
unless a privatized firm runs into financial difficulties.  Thbis  need not be an insurmountable
obstacle to  restructuring.  If  su'bsidies or  external  funding are  not forthcoming,  troubled
enterprises will be forced to reduce wages, eventualy prompting a good part of the labor force
to leave.  Since the social safety net is largely provided by enterprises, open unemployment  is
likely to remain low, but with large wage differentials  between profitable  and unprofitable finms.
Improved corporate control will lairgely  come about as a result of fbactor  market pressures.
With  the present low level of  financial internediation,  banks have very  little leeway  (and
incentive) to keep troubled enterprises afloat.  Unprofitable and unviable enterprises will thus
-not  receive any new r-esources  and will need be liquidated.  For these enterprises, banks will
mainly  be the undertakers to the dead.  In  exchange for supporting viable enterprises with
negative current cash flow - through debt or equity injections - banks will require significant
changes in ownership.  Similar, the creation of new ventures will strongly depend on bank
financing.  Banks are thus likely to become the main agents for capital and outside-control  over
managers, including ownership changes. Corporate  governance wfi then  be 'M state  contingent:  u12
managers of profitable enterprises wil  remain unchallenged and de-facto owners, while bankcs
(or  other  potential  rescuers)  will  assume ownership and  oversight roles  for  unprofitable
enterprises.  Unless limited by regulatory intervention, this will probably entail a development
along the liries of Japanese,  post-war experience.
One of the consequences could be rapid emergence of cross-ownership links between banks
and enterprises.  Indeed, this has already happened.  If Japanese experience is a guide, it could12
also involve a  mapid  decline of worker ownership, as workers sell out to institutional investors,
-such  as banlk,  insurance companies or investment funds."  Given the strong concentration of
financial skIlls in the banldng sector, such an outcome would be highly desirable.
The emergence of some sort of a capital market is essential.  This could take the form of
a  securities  marlet  Anglo-Saxon style.  However,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  financial
information, this is unlikely to be the case.  Banks are likely to become the main monitors of
enterprise perfonnance.  The speed of banking development is thus likely to become a major
determinant for the speed of restructuring and productivity growth in Russia.
Lessons from Russia for Eastem-Europe
Banldng reform in Eastern Europe has not much moved  beyond the perestroika reforms used
in Russia before 1990.  This is unlikely to generate a situation in which banks will take a lead
role in active enterprise restructurings and lending to the new private sector.  Many of the old
state bansl are likely to go on as in the past, lending money passively either to enterprises with
little future or to the government, and little enterprise reformn  will take place.
Banks have to take the lead role in enterprise restructuring, mostly by saying no to request
for new resources, and only in few cases saying yes.  If efficient enterprises and markets are
to emerge, financial sector reform needs to keep pace with privatization as without thorough
banldng  -reforms enteprise  reform will remain incomplete.  Even more than for enterprises, good
corporate governance of banks is crucial.  To turn around the management culture of the state
banks is probably more difficult than to create an entirely new banling  sector.
An accelerated approach to banking reform in Eastern Europe is thus called for.  Russia
presents a useful model for East-European countries. The dismantling  of the old state banks and
the  emergence of  new commercial bank  not burdened by  old loans and old  management
practices in Russia is much more likely to lead to a financial sector which plays an active role
in enterprise restructuring and channels resources to the private sector  than under the East-,-t5l  w
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Europn,  gradual approach to banking reform.
Under an accelerated approach, the remnants of the former state banks would be converted
into fiscal agents for the govemment and a whole new banking system would emerge in parallel
with the old banking system.  Enterprises that are not yet privatized (or liquidated) would
continue to bank with the old state banks until they are privatized or liquidated.  Privatized
enterprises would take their banking business to new banks.
Under this vision, many small and entrepreneurial banks would anse through  entry and spin-
offs.  Large banks are not needed now.  The former socialist countries suffer from too many,
too large enterprises.  Large investments, if needed, can be made from the internal cash flow
of large enterprises.  What is needed  is many small investments  in new enterprises, spin-offs or
joint ventures to finance marketing and distribution, or quality and productivity improvements.
Small banks  can  provide  the  short  tenn  working capital,  payments  services and  equity
investnents in new ventures needed. Eventuay  some of these banks will merge, but only when
legal infrastructure and management  prctices  permiL  Small banlcs are also more appropriate
during the transition, as their failure does not pose systemic risks and banldng supervision will
for the time being be at best highly imperfect and at worst corrupt.
In the short-term, the most powerful technique banks will have for enforcing corporate
govemance will be to pull their credit lines.  In the medium-term,  equity will be come important
and the banlks  should therefore be universal banks. For one, in the risky economic  and financial
environment of  the transition economies, equity stakes paradoxically entail lower risk  than
commercial loans, other than  small amounts of worldng capital.' 4 Furthennore, equity stakes
also confer direct control over management, and possibly more rapid intervention when things
go wrong.
Other than Russia, the most direct precedent and model can be found in the early years of
the second industrial revolution, the late 19th and early 20th century.  Many new joint stock
banks were  then created to  undertake the  financing of  new industial  ventures.  In  most14
countries, these banks were even less regulated  and supervised  than in Russia  today.  Whie
many banks failed, this did not pose systemic  risks  -- quite to the contrary, this was essential
to the efficient  functioning  of the t.apital  market. However,  there is one significant  difference
between  then and now.  Then was a time a rapidly  rising scale-economies  and the emergence
of-large  industria organizations. The problem  in transition  economies  now is the opposite:  to
reduce  gigantic  organizations  to a more human  and manageable  scale. Many  small  investments
are now required;.  which requires familiarity  with local circumstances.- --  ~
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1.  For early analysis see Hinds,  1990, Gelb and Gay,  1991, Braird,  1991, and BG3hm  and Kreacic,
1991.  A reent  analysis is Phelps, Frydman, Rapaczynski and Schleifer, 1993.
2.  For a proposal along these lines see Brainard, 1991.
3.  In a worst case scenario, the total net worth of all former slate banks could be a negative 5-20% of
GDP, depending on the level of debt outstanding.
4.  Newly enterng  foreign bankcs  have mostly focussed  an foreign trade related activities and have done
littlo lending to domestic entrprises.  And lack of domestic capital has prevented the emergence of new
domestic  banks.
S.  A few other countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union (e.g.,  Estonia), have pursued a similar
appa.
6.  Central Bank of Russia regulations require that banks have at least three shareholders, and no
shareholder can hold more than 35 % of a bank or credit institution.
7.  This is not unusual.  Japanese firms relied initially on their banks fcr financial management and
services, as financial skills were scarce.
8.  At times, the minimum was significantly less than US $10,000.  An increase to ECU S million (and
indexed) is to be phased-in over the next several years.
9.  For more details and data see Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993.
10.  Data from Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.
I1.  The state property funds bold the remaining 20%.
12.  See Aoki, 1994.
13.  The dismantling of the  Zaibatsu' conglomertes  in Japan in the late 1940s also involved Iarge
employee ownership that was later reduced as workers sold their stakes (Miyajima, 1994).
14.  Equity stakes can compensate losses with large capital gains.  Commercial loass, by conarast, offer
only downside risks and are appropriate only if losses can be held to very low levels.  At high default rates,
required intermediation margins become so large that only speculative or fraudulent borsowers will be willig  to
take loans at such high real interest rates.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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